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Djibouti’s Foreign Policy Change from Survival Strategy to 







This paper examines Djibouti‟s emerging active regional foreign policy in the post-
Gouled era. The study has multi-pronged strategy: First, it outlines the underlying 
factors for Djibouti‟s emerging as an important player of regional-power politics, 
while at the same time questioning its viability against the backdrop of its domestic 
political and economic situation; second, it explores the potential implications of 
Djibouti‟s emerging active regional foreign policy for Ethio-Djiboutian relations; 
finally, it suggests a viable foreign policy Djibouti needs to pursue towards its 
neighbouring states of the Horn of Africa, a region of security complex. The paper 
is important for students interested in the history and contemporary African politics 
in general and the Horn of Africa in particular. It can also serve as additional 
source of information for policy decision-makers of Ethiopia and Djibouti.  
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Djibouti, the smallest Horn of African nation, has begun pursuing a policy of an 
important player in regional power politics. Being the tinniest nation, Djibouti has 
to, among other things, take care of survival of its independence and politico-
military security in this conflict hot-bed region, where unstable politics,  
dismemberment of states (Somalia being the worst case), displacement of millions 
of people, mismanagement of economic resources, and hunger and famine have 
been frequented. The Horn of Africa has been/and is where proneness to conflict 
and instability exacerbates poverty and backwardness, thereby imposing existential 
threats originating from both the involvement of external powers and destructive 
rivalries exist at regional (local) levels. These levels of complex relations make 
security threat concern the primary objective of foreign policies of the states in this 
part of Africa. In view of political realists, „self-preservation‟, among other things, 
is an important imperative for small states such as Djibouti.  
However, the anomaly in the Horn of Africa has always been that the sub-
region is where small and weak states tend to use power as instrument of foreign 
policy whereas the relatively strong ones exercise restraint. Indeed, the Horn of 
Africa is where win-win diplomacy has been destined to failure because of smaller 
states‟ persistent tendency towards playing „regional-power politics‟. The best 
example of this is the stalemate between Eritrea and Ethiopia after their 1998-2000 
war that persisted unaddressed until very recently.  
This paper examines the emerging foreign-policy activism of Djibouti and 
its implications for Ethio-Djibouti relations. The paper aims at: first, to understand 
and explain the idiosyncrasy (misperceptions and decisions) of the Djiboutian 
leadership in designing the country‟s foreign policy and conducting its diplomacy; 
second, to assess the emerging policy activism of Djibouti and the policy‟s 
implications for economic health and political survival of the tiny Horn of African 
nation; and third, to recommend that Djibouti need to pursue a foreign policy 
dominated by pragmatism towards its Horn neighbouring countries, particularly 
Ethiopia.  
 
Djibouti’s Raison d’etre: Brief historical Background 
The invention of Djibouti and its continued existence owe to foreign interests and 
foreign aid (MRGI, 1997, p. 404; Inter-Africa Group, 2000, p. 3). Djibouti‟s birth 
as a sovereign state was the outcome of French involvement in north-eastern part 
of Africa, stimulated by Anglo-French rivalry in the mid-19
th
 century for control of 
entrance of the Red Sea. Initially, the French interest was in Obock port, from 
where French control extended stage by stage to the territory now called Djibouti. 
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The French interest in the African shores of the Red Sea began with 
Rochetd‟Hericourt‟s exploration from 1839-42, marking the beginning of the 
French colonization of Djibouti. Subsequently, French explorers, using the 
diplomacy of deception, concluded “treaties of friendship and assistance” with 
Afar sultans, from whom they purchased the anchorage of Obock in 1862 (MRGI, 
1997, p. 404). 
In the closing years of 19
th
 century, the Anglo-French rivalry had been 
intensified thereby marking the French interest on Djibouti a counterweight to the 
British in Aden (Dolley, 1987, p. 402). Dolley further argues that the presence of 
British in Egypt and the opening of Suez Canal in 1869 led to the growth of French 
interest in the area. Subsequently, from 1884 to 85 France expanded its 
protectorate to include the shores of the Gulf of Tajoura and the Somaliland. It also 
moved the administrative capital from Obock to Djibouti in 1892 and named it 
„French Somaliland‟ in 1896. By concluding boundary agreement with Emperor 
Menelik in 1897, France marked out the border between its protectorate and 
Ethiopia and thereby consolidated its possession of Djibouti. Leonce Lagarde, who 
developed close relations with king Menelik of Shoa, began a long administrative 
career at Djibouti (Spencer, 1984, p. 28). The 1897 boundary agreement was also 
reaffirmed by 1945 and 1954 eventually leading to its independence in 1977. 
Djibouti‟s path to independence was, in fact, full of twists and turns: It 
combined anti-colonial struggle and decision for continued colonial rule, domestic 
ethnic rivalry, regional politics and policy of the colonial power. In June 1956, a 
territorial assembly was established by Overseas Reform Act and represented in an 
executive council, whose task was to advise the French-appointed governor 
general. In July 1957, the French Somaliland was given a semblance of self-
government. France recognized the peoples of Djibouti to join the French 
community of an Overseas Territory and they were entitled to representation by 
one deputy and one senator in the French Parliament, and a counsellor in the 
French Union Assembly. This status continued until the 1958 and 1967 referenda 
in which the Afars, “with French encouragement,” preferred to continue under 
colonial administration while the majority of the Issa group wanted independence 
(Dolley, 1987, p. 402). Following President de Gaulle‟s visit to the territory in 
1966, another referendum was held in March 1967, when 60 per cent of the 
territory‟s people voted to continue association with France. The majority of those 
who preferred continued association were the Afars. The reason why the Afars 
voted to remain under French colonial rule, arguably, was to avoid incorporation to 





Territory of the Afars and Issas (FTAI), and this was to reflect the interest of the 
Afars.  
This status continued until 1975, when France, forced by a host of 
developments that unfolded after the end of WWII, began to reconsider the need 
for granting independence to Djibouti. Already by the early 1970s, political 
violence in Djibouti demanding for independence, and the pressure from the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) was forcing France to change its policy 
(Inter-Africa Group, 2000, p. 4). In 1976, the territory‟s citizenship law, which 
favoured the Afars, was revised, this time in favour of the numerically strong Issa 
Somalis (Inter-Africa Group, 2000, p. 4). In the referendum held on May 8, 1977, 
majority of people preferred independence. The Republic of Djibouti was born on 
June 27, 1977.  
The invention of Djibouti thus becoming a fait accompli, Hassan Gouled 
Aptidon, an Issa Somali, became the first President. The position of Prime Minister 
was given to Ahmed Dini, an Afar politician (Schraeder, 1993, p. 206). President 
Gouled ruled the Republic of Djibouti for two decades until he was succeeded by 
Ismail Omar Gelleh, also Issa Somali. Born and grown up in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, 
Mr. Ismail Omar Gelleh was Chief of Staff and Head of the Security in the 
government of President Gouled for 20 years. Mr. Gelleh was elected to the 
position of presidency in 1999 with 74 per cent as the candidate of People‟s Rally 
for Progress (RPP), the ruling party.   
 
The Post-Independence Djibouti: Socio-Economic and Political 
Overview 
The Republic of Djibouti is the smallest East African nation with land area of 
23,200 sq. km, and a population of 830,000. It is bordered by Eritrea, Ethiopia, and 
the self-governing territory of Somaliland. The tiniest nation whose population 
spans frontiers separating these states, Djibouti is situated just beside the Strait of 
Bab-el-Mandeb (the maritime chokepoint) and, therefore, is the strategic gateway 
to the Red Sea (Styan, 2013). The Issa Somali and the Afar are the two principal 
population groups of Djibouti. Whereas the Afars inhabit the northern part of the 
country, the Issa Somalis reside in the southern part and also are dominant in the 
Djibouti capital. Although both the Issa Somalis and the Afars are Muslim and 
Kushetic language-speaking groups, they are arch rivals over resources (Lewis, 









Traditionally, the Afars and Issa Somalis are pastoral communities who roamed 
across large areas of land without any regard for political boundaries south of the 
Sahara (MRGI, 1997, p. 404; Lewis, 1997, p. 353). As aforementioned, these two 
main population groups are in conflict with each other despite the fact that they are 
related in religion and language. The territory of Djibouti is mostly arid land, with 
only about 6,000 hectares are arable, less than 10 per cent is rangeland, and there is 
hardly any woodland left (Markakis, 1998, p. 81). Markakis further argues that the 
country‟s agriculture and industry are little developed due to unskilled labour, 
limited natural resources, and harsh climatic conditions.    
The major economic activities of Djibouti are service industries that 
include banking, sea port, airport, and the operation of Addis Ababa-Djibouti 
railway. The country‟s strategic location at the meeting point of the Red Sea and 
the Indian Ocean has naturally placed it on the busiest trade route between the 
Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, through which roughly 60 per cent of all 
commercial ships of the world pass.   
Close proximity to large Ethiopian market and existence of expatriate 
community are also Djibouti‟s important assets. Djibouti Port is the transhipment 
for Ethiopia‟s foreign trade. Particularly after Ethiopia rerouted its freight 
following the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean War, business soared at Djibouti Port.  
 
Nation and State Building: Challenges for Multiethnic States 
Djibouti is a post-colonial multiethnic state that faces the challenges of nation 
building and state building. There is asymmetry in the distribution of key resources 
between the two major population groups of Djibouti. It is the Issa Somalis that 
dominate the politics and economy of the country. Dolley (1987, p. 402) argues 
that this is because of their greater size particularly in Djibouti City, the country‟s 
economic and political power centre. Dolley further argues that this numerical size 
of the Issa group in Djibouti town made the colonial power name the territory 
„French Somaliland‟. The colonial power regarded the Afar group as less 
urbanized and marginalized them.  
When independence came in 1977, the League for the Independence of 
Afars and Issas (LPAI) dominated the country‟s political scene. Hassan Gouled 
Aptidon (an Issa Somali) became President, and the post of Prime Minister was 
left for the Afar, and Ahmed Dini took the post (Dolley, 1987, p. 402-403). The 
trend of giving the Afar group secondary status in the country‟s political structure 
has continued unaddressed. This has been the root cause of civil war in 1991. The 





Unity and Democracy (FRUD) until 2004, when President Gelleh signed peace 
accord with Ahmed Dini, the veteran Afar politician.  
 
Djibouti’s Foreign Policy and Relations 
President Gouled’s Foreign Policy: Strategy for Survival   
During the incumbency of president Gouled, Djibouti‟s survival was under 
security threat that originated regionally. Djibouti was sandwiched between 
Ethiopia and Somalia, both being its bigger neighbours and themselves in 
conflicts. Hence, how to establish and sustain friendly relations with those Horn 
countries was vital concern of Djibouti‟s foreign policy. As Murison (1999, p. 337) 
states, Djibouti‟s Issa dominated authorities were looking at Ethiopia with 
disfavour and suspicion for the allegation that Ethiopia had been sabotaging its 
independence for fear of Issas aspiration for unity with Somalia. Upon 
independence, President Gouled declared that the objective of Djibouti‟s foreign 
policy is preserving its independence and he vowed positive neutrality during the 
1977/78 Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia (MOFA DOC, 2000, p. 144; 
Woodward, 1996, p. 112). As Dolley (1987, p. 403) also argues, “Djibouti has 
maintained a rigidly neutral stance between the opposing forces of Ethiopian and 
Somali nationalism, banning sales of military equipment…to both sides and 
offering its services as a peace mediator.” In practice, however, Djibouti was 
oscillating depending on the balance of power between Ethiopia and Somalia. 
During the early period of the war, Djibouti was supporting Somalia. The Somali 
invading forces used Djibouti as a conduit for arms and personnel, whereas the 
Ethiopian airlines were not allowed to land in Djibouti (MOFA DOC, 2000, p. 
215). Later, when power balance changed in favour of Ethiopia, Djibouti assumed 
a gesture of mediator. Ethio-Djibouti relations improved after the end of the 
Ogaden war, but not significantly as they were supporting each other‟s insurgency 
movements.  
Relations between Ethiopia and Djibouti got strengthened after the 
Ethiopian Peoples‟ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 
1991. A series of efforts have been made to that effect. Exchanges of visits at 
summit level were frequented, and in the years 1993 and 1994 joint ministerial 
commissions meetings took place in order to discuss outstanding bilateral issues 
(Mulushewa, 2005, p. 44-45). Various agreements were reached on issues of 
mutual interests including diplomatic, economic, defence and security, refugee 
repatriation, and extradition of offenders (MOFA DOC, 2000, p. 215). Following 
the agreements Djibouti was also expected to return the military weapons that the 
Derg‟s evacuating army took. Derg officials, such as Captain Melaku Tefera who 
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was accused of „genocide and crimes against humanity‟ were handed over to the 
EPRDF government. The Ethiopian government reciprocated, repatriating 
Djiboutian refugees to their homeland in „safety and dignity‟; Ahmed Dini, the 
veteran Afar politician and faction leader of FRUD, who was residing in Ethiopia, 
was „politely made to leave the country‟ and he went on exile to Paris 
(Mulushewa, 2005, p. 47). Also, as a gesture of good neighbourhood, Ethiopia 
stated its intention to fund the Djiboutian government efforts to improve the 
services of the Port of Djibouti and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway (CDE, 
1997, p. 9).    
In its relations beyond the Horn of Africa, Djibouti pursued a policy of 
„Multiple Identity‟. Djibouti permanently maintained French troops in its territory. 
It expanded bilateral and multilateral relations guided by a foreign policy 
dominated by pragmatism. It established bilateral relations with different countries 
and became member of different regional and global organizations. Djibouti 
became member of OAU (renamed AU), the Non-Aligned Movement, the League 
of Arab States and the UN. In 1986, when IGAD was established, Djibouti hosted 
the founding conference and became permanent seat of the Organization‟s 
Secretariat.  
President Gouled emphasized Djibouti‟s Arab identity, stressing common 
Islamic allegiance of the Afars and Issa Somalis. This was part of his diplomatic 
efforts to solicit support of Arab states, which, he believed, would be necessary to 
ensure his country‟s viability. The continued French military presence in his 
country, his pragmatic foreign policy of “positive neutrality”, and his endeavours 
to diversify his country‟s foreign relations enabled Djibouti to gain and maintain 
relative peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.   
It should therefore be reiterated that regional disorder as well as domestic 
instability due to lack of genuine power-sharing arrangement in the tiny 
multiethnic nation shaped the contours of President Gouled‟s foreign policy and 
the conduct of diplomacy. Diverging ethnic interests coupled with government 
policy of exclusion of the ethnic Afar have been the domestic foundations of his 
foreign policy. Put differently, skilfully designed and pursued foreign policy 
succeeded in preserving Djibouti‟s autonomy and security in this very rough sub-
region of Africa. However, this could not stop regime change that brought Mr. 









Gelleh’s Foreign Policy: Strategy of playing Regional-Power Politics 
From the outset President Gelleh, characteristic to his diplomacy, has made his 
intention clear: He wanted to change Gouled‟s foreign policy. The previous 
Djiboutian regime‟s diplomacy of weak states gave way to Gelleh‟s foreign-policy 
activism. The incumbent Djiboutian government began active involvement in 
regional power politics by hosting Somali national reconciliation conference. He 
facilitated the Arta Conference, which established the Transitional National 
Government (TNG) of Somalia. President Gelleh‟s rhetoric of seeking 
“cooperation among port authorities in the surrounding region” ended up in 
transferring the management of the Port of Djibouti to Dubai Ports World in 2000 
under a 20-year concession agreement.   
The emerging Djibouti foreign policy activism is prompted by the 
incumbent President‟s belief to ensure his country‟s strong presence in the Horn of 
Africa, the Gulf States and the West, and thereby build and enhance its prestige 
and influence (Ofcansky, 2001, p. 445). He commenced and intensified personal 
diplomacy, shuttling in Africa and the Gulf area. In May 1999, he attended a 
meeting of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in 
Kenya. Djibouti is one of the founding members of COMESA, but dropped its 
membership complaining the Common Market was not making tariff reductions 
required by member states. Then Djibouti wanted to renew its membership. 
Arguably, the objectives of renewing Djibouti‟s COMESA membership have been: 
first, to show the country‟s economy has achieved competitiveness regionally; 
secondly, and perhaps most importantly, its President wanted to compensate for 
the declining of the French aid to Djibouti.  
In January 2000, Djibouti and Libya made a deal on education and 
scientific cooperation. In the same month, President Gelleh attended a meeting 
with President Mubarak in Cairo and discussed ways of improving bilateral 
political and economic relations with the Egyptian leader. In the same year, in a 
summit meeting in Sana´a (Yemen) Djibouti, Sudan and Yemen discussed issues 
of security, political, economic, and social cooperation. In May 2000, President 
Gelleh paid official visit to the United Arab Emirates. At the top of President 
Gelleh‟s agenda in all this shuttle personal diplomacy was to secure diplomatic 
support for Djibouti‟s Somali national reconciliation initiative (Ofcansky, 2001, p. 
445). His active involvement in the Somali issue, arguably, has not been to bring 
tranquillity to Somalia, but to redefine Djibouti‟s foreign policy on the Horn of 
Africa. In short, it was the strategy of becoming an important player in the 
regional-power politics. More importantly, Djibouti‟s policy on the Republic of 
Somalia was to short-circuit Ethiopia‟s IGAD mandated mediation efforts to 
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reconcile the warring factions in Somalia and help reconstruct that country. Indeed, 
Djibouti was to display influence on Ethiopia that has been exposed to the 
geopolitical projection of its neighbouring harbour countries since 1991, when the 
independence of Eritrea rendered it landlocked. On the other hand, Somalia 
(because of the failure of its state apparatus) became a battle ground for proxy war 
between the neighbouring countries: Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti. The military 
intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia in 2006 added a new dimension to geopolitics 
of the region. A would-be peaceful Somalia meant diminishing Djibouti‟s 
influence as port service provider to Ethiopia.  
 
Factors for the Foreign Policy Activism 
There are a host of factors for the emerging Djibouti‟s foreign policy activism. The 
major factors are discussed as follows.  
 
 The event of September 11, 2001 has given the Djiboutian government “moral 
and diplomatic stature” to embark on pursuing active foreign policy. The 9/11 
terrorist attack on America was a bonanza for Djibouti. The relationship 
between US and Djibouti has always been good as the government of Djibouti 
has generally been supportive of U.S. and Western powers‟ geopolitical and 
geostrategic interests in the area, as demonstrated during the Gulf War of 1990-
91. In a similar fashion, President Gelleh‟s government took a pro-active stance 
from among Arab League members and supported the anti-terrorist efforts of 
US. In fact, in order not to risk support of the Arab World, he objected US‟s 
unilateral military action against Iraq in 2003 while still allowing the U.S. and 
its allies to construct military bases in his country (Styan, 2013).   
 
 State collapse and disintegration in Somalia is another factor. The „state failure‟ 
in Somalia removed, at least muted, the “Greater Somalia” idea, the policy to 
reinvent a Somali state by unifying all Somali-inhabited Horn areas including 
Djibouti, Ethiopia‟s Somali Region and Kenya‟s Northern Frontier District. 
Particularly for Djibouti the collapse of Somalia removed its psychological fear 
of being swallowed by its big neighbours (Somalia and Ethiopia). The state 
failure in Somalia also removed for Djibouti the possible competition for 
customers of port use. In other words, Somalia in conflict and chaos means that 
it will be unable to attract others‟ eye for port use.  
 
 Ethiopia rerouted to the Port of Djibouti as a result of the 1998-2000 Ethio-





war, competition for Ethiopia‟s port use made relations between Djibouti and 
Somaliland, the self-proclaimed independent de facto state uneasy. Both entered 
into war of words, each trying to lure Ethiopia for its port use. For example, the 
late President Ibrahim Egal of Somaliland, reportedly , considered Ethiopia as:  
 
“A major pawn of the region with a necklet of smaller states 
round her neck, ringing (her) off from the sea.” With regard to 
the role of superpowers in the sub-region, particularly that of 
France without mentioning by name, he saw the presence of 
French military force in the region as “an unofficial guardian of 
regional stability” and if “the hospitality of the hosts of these 
forces is eroding”, he was ready to “offer the French alternative 
facilities and the unreserved hospitality of the Republic of 
Somaliland.” (Indian Ocean Newsletter, 1998) 
 
This was a response to the statement Mr. Gelleh made in 1998, with a capacity as 
the Cabinet Chief of President Gouled government, saying: 
 
Djibouti must not be a prisoner of its colonial history and 
suggested strategic alliance with Ethiopia and the dismantling of 
any foreign military bases which might pose a danger for the 
security of the region, and concluding that whilst „sooner or later 
France would quit the region‟, neighbouring countries would still 
be there. (Indian Ocean Newsletter, 1998) 
 
Be that as it may, the statement of Mr. Egal was a multi-pronged strategy. First, it 
was intended to lure France and Ethiopia for recognition of Somaliland. Secondly, 
it was to attract Ethiopia‟s use of Berbera port. Thirdly, it seems that Egal had been 
disturbed by growing Ethio-Djibouti bilateral relations. But, on the other hand, 
given the lack of regional policy on utilization of resources for mutual 
development and security among the states of the Horn of Africa, Gelleh‟s 
proposal for „strategic alliance with Ethiopia‟, despite rhetoric, could not develop 
as supposed to have been. Tensions have been frequent between them. 
 
 The 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean War is the other factor. Medhane argues that 
Djibouti and Sudan are consumers of peace (Medhane, 2004). Conflicts between 
the Horn states have always been beneficial to Djibouti in terms of security and 
economy. The 1977/78 Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia and the 1998-
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2000 War between Ethiopia and Eritrea are the best examples. The continued 
stalemate between Ethiopia and Eritrea until July 2018 has been the most relevant.  
Following the war Ethiopia rerouted foreign trade to Djibouti Port. Afterwards, it 
has been Djibouti that handles Ethiopia‟s import-export trade in the form of 
monopoly. This, besides contributing significantly to its annual revenues, has 
given the tinniest Horn nation diplomatic moral stature to pursue assertive regional 
foreign policy. 
 
 There is also the factor of foreign military bases. A host of foreign powers 
currently are active in constructing military and naval bases in Djibouti for 
geopolitical and geostrategic considerations. The American, European and Asian 
global powers as well as some Middle Eastern states are interested in the control of 
the strategic Red Sea and Indian Ocean area. This has turned Djibouti into a chess-
board for the foreign powers. This is the cost Djibouti has been paying for its 
strategic location with its capacity of small-state status. Regarding the benefit of 
foreign military bases in Djibouti it is possible to say two things. First, their 
military surveillance has provided Djibouti a semblance of peace and stability. As 
far as this author‟s information goes, Djibouti, so far, has not become target of 
international terrorist activities. This makes Djibouti unique in the Horn of Africa, 
the other exceptional state being North Sudan.     
 
In any case, incumbent upon the Djiboutian government is to know that 
the expansion of foreign military bases would not be a long-term guarantee for 
Djibouti‟s secured existence as sovereign state. The involvement of foreign powers 
in strategically important regions like the Horn of Africa has potential effect of 
alienating regional states from one another. Therefore, what is important for 
Djibouti is not alienation but alliance with its immediate neighbours. Alienation is 
a recipe for vulnerability to potential national security threat. Indeed, nobody 
knows who really is controlling Djibouti. This has become a serious cause of 
concern for Horn countries such as Ethiopia that has direct interest in Djibouti 
nowadays (FDRE, 2002).  
 
Djibouti’s Potential Vulnerabilities  
The Problem of the Afars of Djibouti  
Following the 2000 peace accord with the Front for the Restoration of Unity and 
Democracy (FRUD), there is a relative tranquillity in Djibouti. Nevertheless, 
conflict situation in the country is still imminent (Kebede, 2005, p. 84-85). One of 





country‟s political and economic affairs. The Afar grievance has been 
overshadowed by the presence of foreign military bases in the country. For 
example, Djibouti is one of the key allies of the US in the Horn of Africa. The 
imminence of conflict due to ethnic tension does not seem to attract the attention of 
the US.   
Djiboutian government‟s policy that favours the Issa Somalis has also 
become source of attraction for people of Somali origin to flock into Djibouti, 
thereby exacerbating the already precarious situation of the ethnic Afar people 
there. As Markakis (1994, p. 217) correctly notes, “Access to state power is 
essential for the welfare of subjects”. In Djibouti, state power is not accessible for 
Afars and Issas equally. This means the politically marginalized Afars also are 
disadvantageous economically. For Ofcansky (2000, p. 440), “as government 
entrenched a nominal proportionality, the Afars have been discontented”. Hence, 
the Djiboutian Afars demand for power-sharing arrangement on the basis of 
democratic system of government which is the issue that stands to be addressed 
yet.  
Domestic politics and foreign policy of a state are interrelated, reinforcing 
each other. This implies that a country‟s domestic politics influences the foreign 
policy it pursues towards other countries. This taking spill-over effect into account 
is particularly so in the Horn of Africa where the states are interdependent in many 
ways. The Horn of African states, among other things, have inter-ethnic ties. As a 
result, anything that happens to an ethnic group in one country shapes policies of 
neighbouring countries. This does not, however, mean that ethnicity do always 
matter in foreign policies of Horn states. It rather means the states securitize 
interests of ethnic groups that cross national borders. Regarding this, there are 
instances with respect to the Afar group in Djibouti. Three major facts are 
described here. 
 
1. In the 1958 and 1967 referenda the Afar of Djibouti, as aforementioned, voted to 
continue under colony. This was not only for fear not to be dominated in 
independent Djibouti, but also not to be incorporated by Somalia (Dire, 1992, p. 
420). The decision has also been influenced by the Ethiopian Afar elites favoured 
by the Imperial government of Haile Selassie (Kebede, 2005). 
2. Before the 1974 Revolution, “Ethiopia‟s policy towards Afar was to neutralize 
them from the Eritrean struggle for secession and keep Djibouti within the 
Ethiopian influence to secure its economic and strategic interests through the help 
of influential Afar elites” (Shehim and Searing, 1984, p. 214). For example, the 
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government of Haile Selassie claimed Djibouti on the basis of ethnic, geographic 
and economic grounds. At a conference held in 1966, the Emperor spoke:  
 
[O]f the people, who the majority compose the population of the 
territory (Djibouti) are extension of the people of Ethiopia and 
are therefore Ethiopians. [T]he destiny of the people of Djibouti 
cannot be decided without Ethiopia‟s interference (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1966, p. 1). 
 
As can be observed, the Emperor‟s speech was in reference to ethnic ties 
between the Afar groups in Ethiopia and Djibouti, making it explicitly clear that 
what happens against the Afars in Djibouti would concern Ethiopia. Subsequently, 
the Djibouti Afar Liberation Movement (MLD), which demanded „re-unification 
of Afars‟, was allowed to operate in Dire Dawa, Ethiopia along with financial 
backing” (Tholomier, 1981, p. 85; Thompson and Adloff, 1968, p. 85). However, 
the Emperor‟s policy was not accepted by the Afars perhaps because of the then 
„Christian Amhara and Tigrian dominated politics‟ of Ethiopia. After the 
revolution of 1974, the condition of the Afars of Ethiopia has been in perpetual 
change. The Derg regime, albeit belatedly, recognized regional autonomy for the 
Ethiopian Afar region. Since 1991, the Afar Region is one of the nine constituent 
regions of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The impact the 
developments in Ethiopia would have on attitudes of the Afars of Djibouti and 
Eritrea is outside the purview of this paper.   
3. Driven by its formal Marxist ideology, the Derg regime renounced Ethiopia‟s 
claim over Djibouti. Moreover, to the dismay of Ali Mirah, the powerful Afar 
Sultan and Haile Selassie‟s most favoured traditional Afar leader, the Ethiopian 
military government passed legislation nationalizing rural lands in 1975. In so 
doing, the Derg “ignored heavy security risk” (Kebede, 2005). In May 1976, the 
Derg issued a Programme of National Democratic Revolution (NDR), recognizing 
the right of „regional autonomy‟ for nationalities in Ethiopia. The implementation 
of this was delayed until the end of 1980s. Subsequent to the declaration of NDR, a 
pro-Derg Afar National Liberation Movement (ANLM), the splinter group of the 
Afar Liberation Front (ALF) that was led by Sultan Ali Mirah, was allowed to 
operate from Ethiopia. The ANLM pursued a policy of creating “an autonomous 
Afar State within the borders of „Free-union Ethiopian Nations‟ (ANLM, 1976, p. 
6; Kebede, 2005). According to Shehim and Searing (1980), the ANLM policy 





Selassie demanding an “Afar State” that would have mutual benefits for the Afars 
and the Ethiopian state. The stated aspirations included: 
 
a more and equal distribution of social services and education 
among ethnic groups, as a pole of attraction for the Afar of 
Djibouti who would seriously consider joining Ethiopia as an 
alternative to absorption into a “Greater Somalia”, and aid in the 
pacification in the province of Eritrea by detaching the Afar 
regions and … assure access to the Port of Assab. (Shehim and 
Searing, 1980, p. 224)     
 
The plan, however, was not implemented for the obvious reasons.  Kebede 
(2005, p. 93) argues that the goals the Afar elders outlined have been „seriously 
considered by the last two successive Ethiopian regimes‟: the Derg and the 
EPRDF. But Kebede‟s argument can be questioned on the grounds that both the 
Derg regime‟s policy of „regional autonomy‟ and the EPRDF regime‟s self-
determination including and up to secession sought for political expediency of the 
respective regimes. In short, the policies of the regimes have not been designed to 
implement the plan of the Afar elders. The Derg regime‟s policy of regional 
autonomy was sought to silence dissident movements against its policies. The 
EPRDF regime recognized the right of self-determination for nations and 
nationalities of Ethiopia, and instituted nine constituent states –of which one is the 
Afar region – of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia with self-governing 
status and participation in federal affairs. In practice, however, none of these have 
been moving in the right direction. Details of the constitutional stipulation vs. 
actual practice on the ground are beyond the scope of this piece. Be that as it may, 
however, one thing is true: the condition of Ethiopian Afars is far better than that 
of their kith and kins in Djibouti and Eritrea. The Ethiopian Afars, arguably, are 
better placed to influence the policy of the Ethiopian government towards the 
Afars in other parts of the Horn.  
To recapitulate, the problem of the Afars has continued in independent 
Djibouti. President Gouled forced many Afars out of his government and national 
army in favour of Issa Somalis (MRGI, 1997, p. 404). The exclusion resulted in 
civil war in Djibouti between the Afars based FRUD and the government from 
1993 to 2000. This was a war that a country like Djibouti could not afford. The 
government, initially, was unwilling to enter talks with the FRUD, thereby leading 
the country to lose financial aid from France as well as political and moral support 
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of Horn states. Pressed externally, the government signed peace accord brokered 
by Libya in 2000. 
Despite peace deal, it doesn‟t seem that the grievance of the ethnic Afar in 
Djibouti has been addressed. Should this continue, Djibouti will continue to be 
vulnerable to another civil war, which will have repercussions on policies of its 
neighbours (Ethiopia and Eritrea) that have Afar constituency. Particularly, 
Djibouti cannot ignore maintaining healthy relations with Ethiopia.    
 
Ethio-Djibouti Relations  
Relations between Djibouti and Ethiopia have been cordial. This is despite 
Djibouti‟s harbouring fear of its „big neighbours‟, particularly with a memory of 
Addis Ababa‟s alleged scheming with France against its independence from 
French colonial rule (Amare 1989, p. 484). Amare further explained:  
 
The government of Haile Selassie sided with France over its 
refusal to de-colonize Djibouti for fear that a Muslim Djibouti 
will succumb to the pressures of, and be controlled by Ethiopia‟s 
enemies, thus depriving it of a major outlet to the seas.  
 
After 1975 the military junta that overthrew Haile Selassie‟s government 
accepted Djibouti‟s independence with the proviso that independent Djibouti 
would not embark on anything that would harm Ethiopia‟s interest in Djibouti. 
After independence, the two countries established bilateral diplomatic relations and 
exchanged resident missions. The relationship has been particularly strengthened 
after 1998, when Ethiopia rerouted to the Port of Djibouti. Joint ministerial and 
commission meetings were frequented. A series of agreements were reached on 
issues of mutual interests including economic, political, military, security 
(Hassabie, 2005, p. 35-38). Nevertheless, relations have not been fault-free; there 
were tensions particularly relating to transit issues. The transit tensions mainly 
have been owing to the fact that Djibouti transferred the management of its ports to 
the DP World under a 20-years concession. The agreement was signed in 2000. 
Djibouti‟s emerging foreign policy activism is also part of its efforts to rival 
Ethiopia on Somali national reconciliation issue.  
Regarding the issue of Ethiopia‟s transit to the sea it is important to put the 
current Ethio-Djibouti relations in historical perspective. Ethiopia is the oldest 
nation in Africa and one of the few largest in terms of territory. On the other hand, 
it is the only north-eastern African nation to experience the challenges of 





powers in this region beginning from 16
th
 century, Ethiopia has been time and 
again divorced with the Rea Sea and the Indian Ocean coasts (Petridis: 1969, p. 
135-36).  
Consequently, the quest for secure access to the sea has been recurrent 
theme of Ethiopia‟s foreign policy. Struggles have been made to regain and retain 
access to ports and coasts of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Ethiopian rulers 
sought to avoid or mitigate the burden of dependency on others for transit and port 
services. For instance, Emperor Menelik ceded about 12,000 square kilometres 
territory to France by the 1897 Franco-Ethiopian border agreement. In quid-pro-
quo, France recognized Djibouti as Ethiopia‟s natural outlet (Petrdis, 1969, p. 5). 
Marcus (1983, p. 50) argues that “even though entered bilateral agreements with 
colonial powers that have coastal outposts in the region, Ethiopia never consented 
to and contented with inter-European treaties and agreements that had the effect of 
isolating her from the Red Sea littoral.” Ethiopian rulers at varying times claimed 
that Ethiopia‟s territorial space had been larger, even extending beyond the Horn. 
In his circular to European colonial powers, Emperor Menelik stated he would not 
be a „spectator‟ when they, coming from afar, were dividing the continent into 
spheres of influence. This was part of his quest for access to the sea. However, the 
objectives of foreign powers have always been to frustrate Ethiopia, denying it 
access to the sea (Bekure, 1993, p. 30).   
The advantage of having military weapons superiority allowed Britain, 
France and Italy to occupy territories and establish outposts at Ethiopia‟s gates to 
the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Following Ethiopia‟s military victory over the 
invading Italian army at Adwa in March 1896, they established diplomatic 
relations and concluded boundary agreements with Emperor Menelik. The 
boundary agreements fixed the colonial powers to their coastal outposts. On the 
other hand, the agreements halted Ethiopia‟s drive towards the sea and rendered it 
landlocked (Negussay, 1977). 
After the end of World War II, the European outposts at Ethiopia‟s 
doorsteps to the sea gained independence. The boundary delimitation agreements 
the colonial powers signed with Emperor Menelik are the ones marking out the 
borders Ethiopia today has with its neighbours, sustaining its quest for secure 
access to the sea. Ethiopia‟s neighbours, except South Sudan, are harbour states. 
To ensure and secure outlet to the sea Ethiopia needs peaceful relations with those 
countries. Ethiopia needs a viable foreign policy carefully designed and managed 
with skilful diplomacy. There have also been problems. First, some states of the 
Horn of Africa pursued misguided policy towards Ethiopia, harbouring wrong 
perceptions about its policy intentions on the region. Second, because of its 
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strategic importance the Horn of Africa has been/is the most penetrated by external 
powers for hegemonic drives, thereby making relations between the regional states 
unhealthy. As a result, at no time of modern political history of this sub-region of 
Africa, Ethiopia‟s quest for access to the sea has been resolved permanently. 
Whoever controlled the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean coasts never desisted from 
opting to make Ethiopia weak by maintaining its landlockedeness.  
In the post-World War II, Ethiopia, with skilful diplomacy and US 
connivance, regained Eritrea and access to the sea (Bahiru, 1998, p. 145). In 1945, 
Emperor Haile Selassie met President Roosevelt at the Suez Canal, in Egypt. At 
the top of the Emperor‟s list of agenda for discussion with the American President 
was the issue of Ethiopia‟s access to sea (Mulatu and Yohannes, 1993, p. 173; 
Spencer, 1984). From 1941 to 1950 Eritrea was under British military 
administration. In 1950, UN General Assembly passed a decision to federate 
Eritrea with Ethiopia and brought the British military administration to an end. 
Then, Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia as autonomous self-governing entity in 
September 1952. The Ethiopian government unilaterally began encroaching on 
Eritrean autonomy, and finally in 1962 incorporated it into Ethiopia as a province. 
Eritrean nationalists opposed to the unilateral incorporation and started armed 
struggle to liberate Eritrea. In 1961, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), from 
which the Eritrean People‟s Liberation Front (EPLF) splintered in 1975, was 
established in Cairo, Egypt. Civil war rocked Ethiopia for about thirty years. The 
independence of Eritrea in 1991 de facto and in 1993 de jure reversed Ethiopia to 
its landlocked status (Kinfe, 2001a, p. 524-25). From 1991-1998, Ethiopia‟s main 
outlets to sea were Assab and Massawa. Assab handled about 80% of Ethiopia‟s 
import-export trade (Henze, 2001; Styan, 2013).  
As a result of the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean War, Ethiopia rerouted to 
Djibouti, which handles about 97% of Ethiopia‟s cargo. The transit and port 
service charge payments of Ethiopia significantly contributed to Djibouti‟s annual 
revenues. Despite this, Djibouti‟s policy towards Ethiopia with regard to port issue 
is full of twists and turns. This was reminiscent to the French colonial policy. The 
concern of France was always how to control Ethiopia‟s foreign trade transited 
through Djibouti port (Spencer, 1984, p. 32). The following are worth mentioning. 
France supported Emperor Menelik II when he denounced the Wuchale Treaty, 
into which Italy had introduced Art.17 to claim Ethiopia as its protectorate. France, 
although a subterfuge on paper, proposed a treaty of alliance and friendship with 
Ethiopia. When Ethiopia defeated Italy at Adwa in 1896, France supported 
Ethiopia with fire arms (Spencer, 1984, p. 31). During the WWI, Italy, violating its 





and France. But in 1917, Italy demanded Djibouti; France; angered by this, 
renewed its promise of 1897 to Emperor Menelik. The promise was „if ever France 
should leave Djibouti, it would be ceded to Ethiopia‟ (Spencer, 1984, p. 32). 
However, this could not survive the test of time and selfish interests. The 
promises and proposals were frustrated in 1935, when France joined the Anglo-
Italian adventure of handing Ethiopia over to Italy in quid pro quo for anti-Hitler 
stance. In the same year, France contrived against Ethiopia by allowing Italy to 
pass all “arms, ammunition and implements of war” through Djibouti port. On the 
other hand, Ethiopia, whose only access to sea was Djibouti, was refused to transit 
any weapons through that corridor. As Marcus (1983, p. 51) states, France‟s 
refusal to permit Ethiopia arms shipments from the Port of Djibouti to Addis 
Ababa in 1935 was “the real antecedent of fascist invasion and occupation of 
Ethiopia in 1936.” John Spencer (who agreed with Marcus) argued that France also 
blocked Ethiopia‟s use of the Ethio-Djibouti Railway. Spencer explained:  
 
It was degrading to have to respond to the argument that, in a war for 
survival of an independent country, it was necessary to France to 
violate an agreement with that country in order to preserve intact for 
the French government, French banks, and French stockholders 
investment in that railway. (Spencer, 1984, p. 46)   
 
Independent Djibouti has also made several promises with regard to 
Ethiopia‟s use of Djibouti port. In 1981, when the Derg regime began to 
„implement‟ its policy of regional autonomy, Djibouti was declared a free port to 
Ethiopia. Similar gestures have been made by President Gelleh. To lure Ethiopia‟s 
use of Djibouti port, he even went to the extent of proposing economic cooperation 
and political integration. These, however, have not seen the light of day, being 
overshadowed by ambitions for regional power. From the economic front, the 
rhetoric was to recognize Djibouti port as natural outlet for Ethiopia. In practice, 
the Djibouti leadership frequently has been introducing new tariff rules imposing 
high rate of transit and port service charge payments on Ethiopia. It is true that 
Ethiopia is the major Djibouti port user, contributing significantly to the annual 
revenues of that tiny Horn nation.  
To recapitulate, the foreign policy of President Gouled was to preserve the 
independence of Djibouti. His regional diplomacy was to show the gesture of 
„neutrality‟, non-interference in interstate conflicts. He established a chain of 
relations to solicit diplomatic support. All this relations of courtship had given the 
country relative stability and guarantee of existence in this conflict hot-bed region. 
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This carefully designed and skilfully managed astute diplomacy could not survive 
the change of guards in Djibouti. The post-Gouled‟s Djiboutian leadership has 
become most ambitious. It seeks active involvement competing for regional power 
politics. But it is wise for Djibouti to see that this is against its domestic socio-
economic and political reality.   
With regard to landlocked Ethiopia, without a viable foreign policy for 
outlet to sea, it has suffered/will continue to suffer from pressures of powers 
controlling northeast African seashores. “The strategic objective of the colonial 
powers in battling over the sea ports in the region was to obstruct the transit of 
firearms destined to Ethiopia” (Zewde Gabre-Selassie, 1975, p. 201). As 
aforementioned, Ethiopia‟s rulers at varying times struggled militarily and 
diplomatically to regain and retain its legitimate interests on the Red Sea and 
Indian Ocean coasts. Indeed, the issue of access to the sea has been/is a test for 
friends and foes of Ethiopia.  
For example, central to the Ethio-Djiboutian relations is the issue of 
Ethiopia‟s port use. International law of the sea recognizes the right for access to 
the sea of landlocked countries, but also makes bilateral relations the necessary 
modality. Ethiopia and Djibouti signed a document known as “Agreement on Port 
Utilization and Services to Cargo in Transit” on April 13, 2002. As above 
mentioned, Djibouti however has not been observing the terms of the Agreement. 
Legal scholars argue that the law among nations is essentially political clothed 
with legal terminology (Shaw, 2005). In international relations there are two major 
contending theories: realism and liberalism. In view of proponents of realism, 
relations among nations depend on relative power position. For the realists the 
efficiency of international agreement depends on relative capability of contracting 
party states. The bargaining power of the state with landlocked status vis-à-vis the 
harbour state is limited. Ethiopia whose nearly all merchandise must pass through 
Djibouti Port is not an exception. Hence, in the interpretation of the Ethio-Djibouti 
Agreement on Port Utilization and Services to Cargo in Transit the position of 
Djibouti prevails.    
In contrast, proponents of liberalism maintain that dependency in inter-
state relations is mutual, based on the principle of give-and-take in good faith. 
Ethiopia and Djibouti are highly interdependent. Djibouti, in many respects, is „a 
flea on Ethiopia‟s back‟. In the hottest months of July, August and September in 
Djibouti, Ethiopia is a cooling place for Djiboutian citizens. It is also Djibouti‟s 
major trade partner (Park, 2005, p. 770). Ethiopia is where Djibouti‟s bread is 






In addition to its being rich in natural resources and human capital, 
Ethiopia has a long tradition in diplomacy. If the diplomatic capital is put in 
practice there are accessible alternative ports in north-eastern African region for 
Ethiopia. Ethiopia has “to consider use of alternative ports of East Africa” (Bekure, 
1993, p. 40). It also has to consider conducting astute diplomacy of resources 
regionalization through scheme of regional integration. It is wise for Ethiopia to 
regain secure access to the sea through port-lease deal with its harbour 
neighbouring countries and, if possible, port purchase. Ethiopia, very recently, has 
started making deals to take share in management of ports with its neighbours. 
This includes developing ports together with harbour neighbours and foreign 
company such as DP World. The deal entails Ethiopia will be a shareholder of the 
ports as well. Besides, it is engaged in providing neighbouring countries with 
hydroelectricity in quid-pro-quo for port use (Medhane, 2004). This can serve as a 
short-term strategy for alternative port use. The normalization of the Ethio-Eritrean 
relations is also an opportunity that has opened a new era.    
All the above mentioned unfolding developments have the potential to put 
Djibouti at the losing end in terms of economy and national security. The country 
is based predominantly on service economy: port and banking services. Ethiopia 
with a thriving economy as well as the major user of Djibouti port is indispensable 
to Djibouti. Secure and developed Ethiopia is useful for Djibouti‟s economic and 
national security. Djibouti‟s transboundary ethnic ties are complex in the Horn of 
Africa. The Afar and Issas of Djibouti have their kins in Ethiopia, Eritrea and 
Somaliland. This suggests that Djibouti needs to seriously consider fair power-
sharing arrangement between the two major ethnic groups of its population. 
Since recently Ethiopia has good relations with all its neighbours. The 
reason why Djibouti has been pursuing a foolish regional foreign policy hanged on 
the assumption that the damaged Ethio-Eritrean relations would always remain the 
same. This has proved to be wrong. The Ethio-Eritrean relations have changed for 
the better following the coming to power of Abiy Ahmed in 2018. On top of that 
foreign powers‟ economic and diplomatic support would change in time. The 
foreign powers‟ economic assistance and diplomatic support would also cease with 
the passing of time. The geopolitical and geostrategic calculations of global powers 
are always in constant flux. But Djibouti and Ethiopia will always remain together 
as neighbours.   
 
Concluding Remarks: What Policy Options for Djibouti? 
Located at the world‟s major shipping lanes, Djibouti today has become strategic 
magnet of foreign powers. In the era of revolution in communication and 
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information technologies, the importance of strategic location is susceptible to 
change. In this vein, Djibouti needs to design a viable foreign policy to secure its 
security internally as well as regionally.   
Internally, it is fragile in terms of politics and economy. From the political 
front, ethnic relations of Djibouti‟s major population groups do not seem to be 
healthy, to say the least. The problem of the ethnic Afars of Djibouti has not been 
addressed. It has persisted, awaiting a democratic system of government 
established in an environment of free, fair and regular elections. Djibouti has 
multiparty system and political parties operate. But the multiparty system is a 
political subterfuge, only necessary for public consumption. For the Afar of 
Djibouti, the 2000 peace deal is yet to be implemented. From the economic front, 
the Djiboutian leadership‟s policy drive is to make Djibouti a prosperous country. 
Although this is not bad, it is against the reality on the ground. First, the country‟s 
economy is based on service industry which is highly susceptible to shocks. A 
saying goes, „when Djibouti‟s transport sector sneezes, the whole economy catches 
cold‟. The civil war in the 1990s did not only damage the country‟s image as an 
„oasis of peace‟, but also affected it economically (Styan, 2013). Second, the 
foreign assistance is not also sustainable. In 2000, Djibouti transferred the 
management of its port and later customs and airport to DP World on the basis of a 
twenty-year concession agreement (Oneko, 2018; Palin, 2017). The advent of the 
Dubai Company in the country, it seems, was a rescue mission to Djibouti‟s 
service industry. Djibouti also has the fear of French troops withdrawal, which has 
shaped Djibouti‟s foreign economic policy since 2000.  
Regionally, Djibouti is vulnerable to security threats. To the south of 
Djibouti is Somalia marked by „state failure‟ since 1990s. To the north is Eritrea, 
with which Djibouti has had military clash as a result of a dispute over Mount 
Dumera. Immediately across the Red Sea is Yemen, another „failed state‟, with 
spill-over effect. Such a regional environment does not give Djibouti a peace of 
mind. Djibouti is the smallest in the Horn of Africa that needs to pursue soft-power 
diplomacy of small states (Cooper and Shaw, 2009). The policy of regional-power 
politics that Djibouti pursues cannot be a passport to its national security. Djibouti 
hosts the Headquarters of IGAD Secretariat since the organization‟s establishment 
in 1986. This could have served Djibouti as diplomatic capital to design a clever 
foreign policy managed by astute and skilful diplomacy. In a nutshell, the most 
important task ahead for the incumbent Djiboutian leadership is to learn from the 
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